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Abstract
Despite heady growth in cross-border investment into commercial real estate over
recent decades, there are few studies that examine differences in investment preferences
between domestic and cross-border investors at a micro level. We address the gap by
examining the characteristics of assets acquired by cross border investors in six major
US metro areas, comparing them with the purchases made by US investors in those
same areas. Our study uses data on more than 67,500 transactions recorded by Real
Capital Analytics (RCA) over the period from Q1 2003 to Q3 2016. As well as
examining cross-border investors in aggregate, we isolate and examine purchases by
investors from each of the four principal source nations for cross-border real estate
investment in these cities. This is important since treating cross-border investors as a
single group may obscure important differences between them. We employ multilevel
logit techniques and we find across a number of specifications that cross-border
investors prefer larger assets, newer assets and CBD locations regardless of nationality.
However, temporal and sectoral patterns of investment, as well as evidence for return
chasing behavior, vary with the nationality of investor being studied.
Keywords Commercial real estate . Cross-border investment . Foreign investment .
Investor preferences . Multilevel modelling . Return chasing behavior
Introduction
Financial reforms across many developed economies in the 1970s and 1980s ushered in
an era of liberalized capital markets that facilitated large scale cross-border investment
in both financial and real assets. This presaged tremendous growth in global real estate
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investment in the decades that followed. Cross border investment in real estate may be
motivated by push factors such as economic policies in the home nation and
comparatively fewer opportunities for investment in the home market, and pull
factors such as expectations of returns from the host market and potential
diversification benefits. However, such activity is typically selective when it comes
to the countries, cities and assets that are chosen for investment. Geurts and Jaffe (1996)
and Holsapple et al. (2006) draw attention to institutional factors, risks and costs that
influence the destination of cross-border real estate investment, something that has been
studied empirically at a country level, but which also applies to choices of locations and
assets within target countries. It is the latter aspect that this paper seeks to explore
further.
McAllister and Nanda (2015) suggest that certain cities act as gateway markets for
foreign real estate investment in their countries. These are often the largest cities in
which a critical mass of investors, advisors and information exists that serves to
enhance liquidity and reduce information, search and transaction costs for cross-
border investors. Moreover, in such cities, the distribution of foreign investor activity
is unlikely to be uniform across areas or types of assets. We anticipate that the
properties targeted by cross-border investors will be larger, newer and located in the
best researched (CBD) submarkets where the perceived advantages of quality, trans-
parency and the ability to deploy significant capital are likely to be greatest.1 Yet there
are very few studies to date that examine the revealed preferences of cross-border
investors at a micro-level.
Hence, this study examines six important gateway cities for cross-border real estate
investment in the United States to determine the asset and submarket preferences of
non-domestic investors in such cities. We analyze real estate acquisitions in New York,
Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco and Washington DC over 2003–2016.
These were the largest cities for domestic institutional investment in our study period
and were among the top destinations for cross-border investment in commercial real
estate. We use multilevel logit techniques which reflect that the probability of choosing
particular types of assets might be conditional on selection of a particular metro at an
earlier stage of investment decision making. The modelling uses an array of property
characteristics, control variables and lagged total return rates for different property
types in each area to understand the factors that might be driving investment choices.
We find that cross-border investors prefer larger properties, newer properties and
CBD locations regardless of nationality. This is consistent with our expectations.
However, we find that German and Chinese investors exhibit distinct preferences for
specific property types, while there are also differences in trend chasing behavior
among cross-border investors, this being particularly evident for the Canadian investors
in our sample. The study of individual national groups is an important innovation in
this study, as prior research typically treats foreign/cross-border investors as a single
entity. This is problematic if preferences for certain attributes vary between investors
from different nations. Cultural and institutional factors may influence the risk and
return preferences of different investor groups, and hence the preferences for those
1 Nonetheless, a strategy of focusing on, say, major CBD office markets in global cities might be counter-
productive for wider diversification objectives. This issue lies outside the scope of this paper, but see Lizieri
and Pain (2014) for further discussion.
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attributes that influence asset performance, leading to different outcomes regarding
asset acquisition.
Literature Review
Initial research into international real estate investment focused on issues such as
diversification benefits, investment barriers and exchange rate issues. This work is
summarized well by Sirmans and Worzala (2003). More recent research that has sought
to explain motivations for and patterns in cross-border investments has typically
incorporated perspectives from institutional economics. This includes the ways in
which formal and informal structures that comprise a market work to enhance or
obstruct cross-border real estate acquisitions. Holsapple et al. (2006) propose a mod-
ified version of the Dunning Eclectic Paradigm to examine how institutional factors
impact the volume and destination of cross border real estate investment, noting the
connections with both foreign direct (FDI) and foreign portfolio (FPI) investment
activity. McAllister and Nanda (2016a) also discuss how foreign investment in com-
mercial real estate has attributes of both FDI and FPI.
In terms of empirical work, Lieser and Groh (2014) explored a wide range of
economic, socio-demographic and institutional variables for 47 national real estate
markets in order to determine the factors most important for international investment.
This included indicators such as real GDP growth, population growth and tax rates, and
composite indexes from their own earlier work on real estate market attractiveness (see
Lieser and Groh 2011). They found that positive economic and demographic features
encouraged real estate investment, along with deep, sophisticated capital markets.
Meanwhile, investment was deterred by legal, regulatory and political risks and
barriers. Lieser and Groh concluded that investment patterns reflect economic and
institutional characteristics of nations. Yet, while their conceptual framework focused
on international real estate investment, Mauck and Price (2017) note that their data
comprised total transaction activity (domestic and foreign) in each nation, so further
work on cross-border investment flows has been necessary.
Fuerst et al. (2015) built on the research of Lieser and Groh (2014) by distinguishing
foreign from domestic real estate investment and by adding variables on real estate
liquidity, transparency and performance for their sample of 24 countries. They noted
that deviations existed from a natural or naive pattern where global commercial real
estate investment is proportional to the size of each nation’s investable stock. The
authors then examined a range of variables representing different institutional and
macroeconomic features of each country, but found no role for institutional and legal
barriers in explaining inflows of cross-border capital. This might reflect the short period
and subset of countries studied. However, they did find that liquidity, defined as the
ease with which investors could enter/exit a market, was a key variable in predicting
cross-border investment into commercial real estate.
McAllister and Nanda (2016a) considered a different array of national variables
capturing scale, wealth, distance and cultural factors for over 100 countries in order to
unpack the factors most affecting cross border real estate investment. Using a gravity
modelling framework, they found that geographic distance between markets (a proxy
that captures cultural affinities and information issues) had an expected negative
492 S. Devaney et al.
relationship with cross border capital flows, in line with literature on FPI, FDI and
international trade. Economic size was not consistently significant as a predictor and
the authors concluded that investors might focus on cities rather than countries. Indeed,
many of the studies of pricing effects cited below use city rather than country as the unit
of investigation, while others have used asset level datasets as we do in this study of
gateway markets in the United States.
Very few studies have explored the revealed preferences of cross-border real estate
investors for locations and assets within host nations. Two examples are early studies
by Gerlowski et al. (1994) and Ford et al. (1998). In the former, the authors examined
the location preferences of investors from the UK, Canada and Japan when investing in
US real estate over 1980–89. Together, these three nations accounted for more than
50% of foreign private real estate investment in this period.2 Gerlowski et al. found that
investors from these nations preferred US states with large, developed economies, high
personal income levels and growing populations. Ford et al. studied preferences for
different types of US real estate: apartment, office, retail and industrial. They examined
a range of real estate market variables, including past return rates, construction activity,
vacancy rates, cap rates and rent per square foot, based on a profit/return maximization
argument. They argued that foreign investors made decisions consistent with profit
maximization, selecting property types associated with growth, rising rents, higher
construction activity and lower volatility, though a tendency for these investors to
choose markets where past growth was high suggested an element of trend-chasing in
their real estate investment behavior.
Mauck and Price (2017) compared the domestic and foreign properties held by 699
publicly listed real estate firms to determine if the attributes of their foreign real estate
investments were different. Their data covered assets in 84 countries as at Q1 2014,
though over half (55%) of the properties were located in the US. Logit models were
estimated with both asset and country level variables as explanatory factors. The
country level variables were based on those used by Lieser and Groh (2014) and
captured economic and institutional characteristics. The authors found that the foreign
properties were likely to be larger, but the ownership stakes were smaller. The firms in
the sample were more likely to partner with other firms when investing across borders,
consistent with findings in the mergers and acquisitions literature. Preferences for
particular property types varied according to the attributes of the host country.
Though not focused on cross border investment, Malpezzi and Shilling (2000) offer
a useful study of investment preferences for US commercial real estate at the Metro-
politan Statistical Area (MSA) level. They compared the holdings of US institutional
investors to those of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) with the hypothesis that
investments by the former group would be more concentrated in higher quality
locations. Relative to the stock of real estate, they found that both institutional investors
and REITs tilted their holdings towards quality – defined as larger, higher income and
less volatile locations – but this tilt was much more pronounced for institutional
investors. The authors argued that this reflected the varying legal and institutional
constraints under which each group operated, with a greater degree of risk aversion
among institutional fund managers, but they suggest that diversification opportunities
2 In keeping with this work, we identify nations for specific analysis based on their importance in the overall
total of inbound cross-border investment.
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might be foregone as a consequence, a theme also explored by Byrne et al. (2013) for
UK institutional real estate investors.
While asset and location preferences of cross-border investors have not been subjected
to much recent study, there is work on the effects of such investment on commercial real
estate pricing at the local level. This has examined whether the presence of foreign
investors is associated with lower capitalization rates and, thus, higher prices. McAllister
and Nanda (2015) studied cap rate and transaction volume data from 38 US MSA office
markets over the period 2001–13. They found that increased foreign investment equated to
a statistically significant reduction in cap rates after controlling for other factors: a 10%
increase in the proportion of foreign investor transactions corresponded to a c. 80 basis
point drop in cap rates based on their results. They also noted that foreign investment was
more concentrated than domestic investment, with greater focus on the larger MSA
markets, but preferences of cross-border investors were not examined formally.
In similar vein, McAllister and Nanda (2016b) examined 28 European cities over the
period 1999–2013, finding that a 10% increase in the proportion of foreign investor
transactions corresponded to a 30 basis point fall in office cap rates. Variations in cross-
border investment across the cities were noted. Meanwhile, Oikarinen and Falkenbach
(2017) analyzed cap rates for the Helsinki prime office market to explore the impact of
changes in foreign investor activity. They found that a 10% increase in foreign
investment corresponded with a c. 30 basis point drop in cap rates as well. However,
while more cross-border investment appears to raise prices, this does not mean that
foreign investors pay more for properties than their domestic counterparts. Such results
could reflect that the recipient markets become more liquid and attractive to all real
estate investors with an increase in the number and range of participants.
To test whether foreign investors paid more for assets in a given market, Devaney
and Scofield (2017) analyzed over 3000 transactions in the New York City office
market using techniques from studies of local versus non-local investors (see Ling et al.
2018). The authors found that foreign investors paid more at purchase than domestic
investors, but also sold for more when observable features of the asset, location and
counterparty involved were held constant. They suggested that the main driver of the
price differences found was unobserved differences in quality, with foreign investors
targeting higher quality assets. The authors also noted differences in the observable
aspects of acquisitions, with foreign investment activity being more concentrated in the
Manhattan market and with foreign purchases more likely to be of larger and newer
buildings relative to the domestic investor group.
Finally, Crosby et al. (2016) examined pricing for a sample of just under 500 office
buildings in Central London during 2010–12. Although not a central feature of their
study, the authors included variables in their modelling that related to the national
origin and international experience of the purchasers in each transaction.3 Hence, their
study is notable for trying to differentiate between types of international investor. The
authors found that international experience was associated with lower cap rates at the
asset / deal level. They noted that this difference might reflect the selection of higher
quality assets, further motivating our desire to examine cross-border asset and location
preferences in greater detail.
3 Here, international experience included both foreign investors and domestic investors that were known to
have international scope in their investment activities.
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The literature to date provides evidence that cross-border investors exhibit particular
preferences for both the nations and areas in which they invest. However, to our
knowledge, only Mauck and Price (2017) and Devaney and Scofield (2017) formally
examine their preferences for asset level attributes such as size and age, with the latter
study confined to one property type in one location. Furthermore, most of the literature
has considered foreign investors as a single group and has not examined the preferences
of different investor nations individually. Hence, we consider asset and location
preferences for cross-border investors in aggregate and for investors from individual
countries across a range of property types in the six largest ‘gateway’ metropolitan
markets in the United States.
Method
Our study uses data on acquisitions of individual real estate investments within a
sample of six major US metros to infer the preferences of cross-border real estate
investors for different asset and market attributes. For many of the models that we
estimate, the dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether a purchase
was made by a domestic (US) investor or cross border (non-US) investor, with the
value 1 attributed to purchases by foreign investors. Alternatively, the binary variable is
used to distinguish domestic purchases from those by investors from a specific nation,
where the value of 1 indicates that subset of cross-border acquisitions. A discrete choice
logit model is used where modelling of the binary response estimates the probability
that each asset is purchased by a foreign investor or by an investor from country h, as
appropriate. Thus:
logith ¼
Pr Investorh ¼ 1ð Þ
1−Pr Investorh ¼ 1ð Þ ð1Þ
With the basic form (single-level) of the logit model as follows:
logith ¼ β0h þ Xiβi þ ei ð2Þ
Where Xi refer to the characteristics of property i and ei is a matrix of random error
term.
The approach represented in Eq. (2) assumes that probabilities of acquisition by a
particular investor group are not clustered according to, say, property type or metro.
This is unlikely to be the case for two reasons. First, a variable such as metro is likely to
capture common regional aspects that will affect the prospective performance and risk
for all assets in that area, while type could similarly capture common performance
drivers that influence the probability of acquisition. Thus, application of the standard
single level logit model would lead to biases in the parameter estimates. Second, we
anticipate that the decision making process around acquisitions could be hierarchical,
with decisions to allocate capital to particular geographies preceding the search for and
selection of individual assets within target markets. Even if this second argument does
not hold for the investors that we study, the first argument suggests that a multilevel
approach to estimation is prudent.
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Multilevel modelling of datasets featuring different cities and submarkets has
been applied previously in hedonic studies of residential real estate prices.4 Its
application in a commercial real estate context has been less common, but Crosby
et al. (2016) use multilevel modelling to explain variation in office capitalization
rates while Yildirim (2008) uses multilevel modelling in the context of the inci-
dence and timing of default for CMBS loans. In Yildirim, region and property type
are identified as the levels assumed to affect incidence of default prior to consid-
eration of loan-specific attributes. While our application is in a different context, it
is motivated by similar concerns.
One way to approach multilevel modelling is to control for the difference among
metro areas by using random intercepts in the model, which is specified as:
logith ¼ β0h þ Xijkβijk þ u0k þ eijk ð3Þ
Where Xijk refer to the characteristics of property i of type j located in metro k. The
level-2 residual u0k measures the random effect among metros, and eijk is the residual
that can vary across each transaction. However, as Crosby et al. (2016) note, it is
possible that the groups identified by the level variable not only identify systematic
differences in probabilities between observations, but also that group membership will
change how asset level covariates influence the probability of the outcome. For
instance, the likelihood of selecting industrial properties in Chicago versus New York
City might vary owing to the differences in industrial structure between these metro
areas. Hence, the preferences for particular property types might vary between geo-
graphical areas. To reflect this, we introduce a random effect on property types as a sub-
level within metro area (a 3-level random intercept model)5:
logith ¼ β0h þ Xijkβijk þ u0k þ ujk þ eijk ð4Þ
Alternatively, we specify property type as a random slope variable that can vary within
each metro (a 2-level random slope model):
logith ¼ β0h þ Zjk β j þ ujk
 þ X ijkð Þβ ijkð Þ þ u0k þ eijk
¼ β0h þ Zjkβ j þ X ijkð Þβ ijkð Þ þ u0k þ Zjkujk þ eijk ð5Þ
In Model (4), u0k is the level-3 random intercept for the metro-level, while ujkdenotes
the level-2 property type-level variation. Meanwhile, in Model (5), parameter Zjkujk
captures the variation of property types. Log likelihood tests and intra-class correlation
coefficients (ICC) are reported to indicate model performance, where appropriate. Our
commentary discusses those variables that appear to be consistently significant factors
influencing acquisition of properties by either cross-border investors or investors of
specific nationalities across various model specifications.
As well as estimating logit models, we report further multilevel regression models using
the subset of purchases by cross-border investors. In these models, the dependent variable
4 See Leishman et al. (2013) for a review.
5 Alternatively, a cross-classified random intercept model can take metro and sector as parallel level 2 factors
but the cross-classified specification does not fit in this sample, so we do not provide this result.
496 S. Devaney et al.
measures the degree of similarity between the US and the investor home nation on specific,
selected criteria, while the independent variables remain the same. The criteria relate to
economic, cultural and institutional attributes of the nations in the sample. Essentially, these
models test whether there are systematic differences in the attributes of assets acquired by
investors from nations that are ostensibly more like the US. The selected indicators of
national cultural and institutional attributes are discussed in the data section below.
Some studies raise concerns as to whether estimation of multilevel models would be
influenced by small group numbers in the higher levels (see Hox et al. 2017, as a recent
example). Yet limited group numbers might be inevitable when testing ideas for
specific geographic areas. For example, Giuliano et al. (2010) conduct the multilevel
test based on five counties of the Los Angeles region. Theall et al. (2011) have studied
the condition with very small group numbers and suggest that a size of less than 5
groups may fail to detect group-level effects. However, Bryan and Jenkins (2016) note
that, despite the downward biased variance in random intercepts, estimations of the
fixed part and random slope part of a multilevel model should be unbiased Beven if
group number is as small as 10^. To address this potential issue, we employ county as
an alternative geographical level variable to metro for the empirical tests.
Data
Data on private real estate investment acquisitions were provided by Real Capital
Analytics (RCA). The data comprise observations of transactions in six US metro
areas: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Washington DC.6
As noted earlier, these cities are typically seen as gateway markets for cross-border real
estate investment into the US. The data span 2003 Q1 to 2016 Q3, and include
transactions in the apartment, retail, office and industrial sectors. RCA records trans-
actions above a threshold of $2.5 million and the details for these are gathered from
multiple sources including brokerage firms, investors, listing services, press reports and
other public records. Information held on each transaction includes date of the trans-
action, the property address and location, price paid and, where known, details of the
buyers and sellers such as the name, type and nationality of each party.
Some transactions were not usable for this study. First, records for portfolio deals
were removed where these did not identify the individual assets that had been pur-
chased. Second, records were removed if the buyer was a Limited Liability Corporation
(LLC). LLCs are recorded in the data as US investors, but the structure was popular
with foreign investors in this period owing to its liability and tax advantages, particu-
larly in the context of FIRPTA.7 Hence, the LLC designation obscures the true origin
of the investment capital, whether foreign or domestic, and the specific nationality
6 For Boston, Chicago and DC, the metro areas defined by RCA broadly matched the OMB defined
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. For New York City, the sample included deals from adjoining MSAs in
Connecticut. In the cases of Los Angeles and San Francisco, metro areas matched the corresponding
Combined Statistical Areas. Thus, the San Francisco dataset included transactions for San Jose, while the
Los Angeles dataset included deals from Riverside and San Bernardino counties.
7 FIRPTA is the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act. This imposed additional taxation on foreign
real estate investors throughout the study period, but could be avoided by creating a US-domiciled holding
structure. See Devaney and Scofield (2017) for further discussion.
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of the investor from being observed. So we dropped these cases in preference to
treating them arbitrarily as domestic or cross-border investors. These steps resulted
in a final sample of 67,538 observations for analysis. The samples used for
individual models then varied according to model specification and the availability
of individual variables used.
There was a strong temporal pattern in transaction activity over the period studied,
with volumes rising from 2003 to 2007, dropping sharply to a trough in 2009 and
recovering again ahead of a peak in both the number and value of transactions in 2015.
In terms of property type, most records were for transactions of apartment buildings, at
21,293 observations, while the smallest number of records were for retail, at 13,719
observations. The office sector was largest in terms of value transacted, accounting for
49% of dollar volume traded. Table 1 shows the sample size for each of the six metros.
It also shows sample sizes for acquisitions by buyers from four specific nations –
Canada, the UK, Germany and China/Hong Kong, which were the largest source
nations for inbound cross-border real estate investment in terms of number of deals
in this period. For our analysis, these nations offer diversity in terms of geographic
proximity, linguistic familiarity and degree of similarity in market cultures and institu-
tions to the United States.
It can be seen from Table 1 that New York is dominant in terms of the value of
transactions. This accords with other studies of transaction activity in the US
(McAllister and Nanda 2015; Devaney et al. 2017). Los Angeles is slightly ahead of
New York in the number of deals, each metro having around a 30% share of the dataset.
For cross-border investors, New York is dominant in terms of both the number and
value of transactions. Cross-border investors only have a small share of total transaction
activity (at 4.1%), but a much larger share of the dollar volume traded (at 13.4%). This
indicates that cross-border investor acquisitions are larger in magnitude on average.
Canada has the largest sample size among the non-US buyer nations, with twice as
many purchases by Canadian investors versus the next largest foreign investor nation.
McAllister and Nanda (2015) note some issues around the classification of investors
as ‘foreign’, particularly in the context that global institutional investors might have
regional offices in a number of major cities and employ local staff in those offices to
make real estate investment decisions. Furthermore, institutional investors are likely to
invest not only on their own account, but also on behalf of other investors with varying
national and organizational backgrounds. We acknowledge the limitations that this
places on our analysis and we anticipate that it will reduce the scale and statistical
significance of any observed differences between domestic and cross-border investors
in our data. Nonetheless, we are interested in examining what differences in investment
activity remain in the context of more globalized real estate investment markets.8
It was noted earlier that domestic economic conditions, investment opportunities and
institutional factors could affect cross-border investor choices. Empirical testing of such
ideas relies on proxy measures for economic and institutional conditions. Four sets of
proxy variables were used here. First, indexes compiled by Hofstede were used to
8 Some observations in the dataset have two organizations listed as buyers. Where one of these is domestic and
the other foreign, we classify the purchase as foreign and use the foreign nationality in the analysis. If both
organizations are foreign, which is more unusual, we classify the purchase as foreign, but we do not attribute a
specific nationality to the transaction.
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capture differences in national culture. Second, indicators from the CEPII Institutional
Profiles Database were employed to detect differences in national economic and social
institutions. Third, the Real Estate Investment Attractiveness (REIA) index constructed
by Lieser and Groh (2011) was used to represent real estate market attributes and
opportunities. Finally, log of real GDP per capita was used to measure differences in
national wealth and economic development.9
In each case, the difference between figure(s) for the US as the host market and that
of the home market of the investor was calculated; Euclidean distance in the case of the
Hofstede and CEPII datasets where there were multiple underlying indicators, and
arithmetic difference for the REIA and GDP per capital series. However, the distribu-
tion of cross-border real estate investors across nations is not spread evenly. This could
distort analysis that uses all of the cross-border investors, particularly if there are
nation-specific factors affecting the behavior of investors from the principal source
nations. So this motivates examination of investors from the individual countries
identified in Table 1 to identify how choices have varied within the sample of cross-
border investor nations.
Measures relating to the nature or location of the buildings traded form the inde-
pendent variables for the analysis and these are drawn primarily from the RCA dataset.
9 See geerthofstede.com and Hofstede (2001) for discussion of the culture measures. The CEPII Institutional
Profiles Database can be accessed at www.cepii.fr/institutions/EN/ipd.asp. We tested the World Bank Ease of
Doing Business index and the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom as well. Results using these
generated qualitiatively similar findings to those that follow.
Table 1 Number and value of transactions in the dataset after filtering
Domestic Foreign Canada UK Germany China Total
Panel A: no. of transactions
Boston 4093 278 50 10 43 42 4371
Chicago 7160 371 63 33 24 15 7531
Los Angeles 19,742 501 104 27 18 45 20,243
New York City 18,752 815 128 98 74 55 19,567
San Francisco 10,302 448 93 32 33 37 10,750
Washington DC 4734 342 60 47 55 1 5076
Total 64,783 2755 498 247 247 195 67,538
% by number 95.9% 4.1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 100%
Panel B: transactions $bn.
Boston 92.6 17.5 6.0 0.2 2.4 0.6 110.1
Chicago 127.6 16.9 3.6 1.4 2.9 0.5 144.6
Los Angeles 283.3 25.0 5.2 0.5 1.9 2.9 308.3
New York City 432.6 96.0 22.2 4.3 10.3 10.7 528.6
San Francisco 204.2 21.4 3.7 1.3 2.4 3.3 225.6
Washington DC 164.4 24.3 3.4 2.4 4.2 0.0 188.7
Total 1304.7 201.2 44.2 10.1 24.2 17.9 1505.9
% by value 86.6% 13.4% 2.9% 0.7% 1.6% 1.2% 100%
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Table 2 reports summary statistics, pooling data for the six metros but continuing to
distinguish domestic and cross-border investors. Based on earlier discussion, we expect
cross-border investors to prefer newer, larger and higher quality assets. This appears to
be evident from the descriptive statistics in Table 2; the average age of assets bought by
cross-border investors is lower, the average size is larger and a higher proportion of
acquisitions are made in CBD locations.10 It also seems that cross border investors are
more likely to purchase assets in the office sector. However, the differences are not yet
tested statistically with controls for the influence of other factors.
That such differences are apparent need not be viewed as the product of irrational
behavior in asset selection. For example, they might reflect differences in liquidity or
risk-return preferences between domestic and cross-border investors, and among dif-
ferent nationality groups. Different locations and grades of asset will vary in their
prospective returns and risks, and thus in their attractiveness to different investors. We
do not observe the expected return or risk for each asset as at the time of acquisition, but
we do have data from the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries
(NCREIF) on past total return rates for the property type and MSA relevant to each
asset in question. In particular, we focus on the relevant annualized return rate for the
three years prior to each transaction. This allows us to test whether past performance for
the type of property in the area concerned has an influence on asset selection by
different investor groups, alongside other variables.
Results
Our first results are shown in Table 3 and these compare the investment choices of
cross-border investors to those of domestic buyers of US commercial real estate. Cross-
border investors are treated as a single group at this stage. Although we argued that this
may be inappropriate, these results provide a reference point for later tests that examine
specific nationalities in more detail.
Model (1) in Table 3 is a single level discrete choice logit. It assumes that the effects
of different variables on probability of selection are independent of one another. This
implies that preferences for location, type and asset attributes are determined simulta-
neously. Yet decisions to invest in certain metros might precede detailed stock selec-
tion, so various multilevel models are presented in columns (2) to (7) that account for
clustering in the probability of selection across observations and so allow preferences
for particular attributes to be examined conditional on an initial selection step having
occurred. Models (2) to (4) use metro as the primary grouping variable while models
(5) to (7) use counties as a robustness check.11 The variance terms for the random part
of the multilevel models are typically significant, except when metro is used alone as a
random intercept. Yet the ICCs for the random intercept models are low, which
suggests that only a small proportion of the variance in selection decisions is captured
by the random intercept variables in each case.
10 The means of the dichotomous variables indicate the frequency with which that feature is observed in the
data.
11 Sample sizes for the models that use counties are smaller as we remove those counties that had fewer than
20 transactions recorded to overcome estimation problems.
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The results suggest that there are some strong influences on the probability of a
property being acquired by cross-border investors. The conventional model suggests
geographical preferences, with cross-border investors less likely than their domestic
counterparts to acquire assets in Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York City
relative to Boston as the reference location, though it should be stressed that all six
metros were popular for cross-border investment in this period. The coefficients for
model (1) indicate positive preferences for the industrial, office and retail sectors
relative to apartments. Results for other models show that these preferences are
maintained even when the likelihood of choosing a specific location has been taken
into account. Unreported year fixed effects suggest that cross-border investment was
relatively more important in 2010–11 and 2015–16.
Results for the variable measuring past performance of the submarket (as defined by
MSA and property type) suggests that cross-border acquisitions were more likely where
past returns had been higher, even though this offers no guarantee that future returns
will be strong. This finding is consistent across all models and is in line with the
findings of Ford et al. (1998),12 though the magnitude of the effect diminishes in a
multilevel setting. For asset attributes, the results are less surprising, with larger, taller
12 It contrasts with more recent findings for US institutional investors presented by Fisher et al. (2009) which
suggest that return chasing is not evident from the capital flows of NCREIF investors.
Table 2 Means of the independent variables
Domestic Foreign Canada UK Germany China Total
Continuous variables
Price $m 20.1 73.0 88.7 41.1 97.8 91.9 22.3
Size 000 sf 99.6 234.0 303.9 150.6 294.8 213.7 105.2
No of floors 3.7 8.1 8.8 5.8 10.9 8.9 3.9
Age in years 35.9 28.0 25.6 29.6 26.4 37.3 35.6
Prior 1-year return rate 0.128 0.135 0.133 0.140 0.115 0.120 0.128
Prior 3-year return rate 0.114 0.114 0.103 0.128 0.093 0.101 0.114
Dichotomous variables
Apartment 0.32 0.18 0.27 0.28 0.04 0.13 0.32
Industrial 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.24
Office 0.23 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.54 0.55 0.24
Retail 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.29 0.17 0.20
Boston 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.22 0.06
Chicago 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.11
Los Angeles 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.23 0.30
New York City 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.29
San Francisco 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.16
Washington DC 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.01 0.08
CBD location 0.28 0.44 0.43 0.51 0.72 0.44 0.29
Partial interest 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.05 0.31 0.10 0.04
Bought to renovate 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.05
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Table 3 Single and multilevel logit models for cross-border versus US buyers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lv-3 RI n/a n/a Metro n/a n/a County n/a
Lv-2 RI n/a Metro Sector Metro County Sector County
Lv-2 RS n/a n/a n/a Sector n/a n/a Sector
Fixed part
Chicago −0.180* – – – – – –
[−1.76]
DC Metro −0.161 – – – – – –
[−1.53]
LA Metro −0.572*** – – – – – –
[−5.69]
NYC Metro −0.535*** – – – – – –
[−5.36]
SF Metro −0.259** – – – – – –
[−2.56]
Industrial 0.469*** 0.474*** – 0.351 0.465*** – 0.49**
[6.17] [6.00] [1.38] [5.73] [2.33]
Office 0.550*** 0.560*** – 0.593** 0.450*** – 0.572***
[7.63] [7.90] [2.38] [6.20] [2.74]
Retail 0.616*** 0.625*** – 0.725*** 0.635*** – 0.668***
[7.29] [7.73] [2.86] [7.82] [3.18]
Prior return 3.058*** 2.947*** 2.162*** 2.108*** 2.303*** 1.622** 1.48**
[4.25] [4.35] [3.05] [2.97] [3.38] [2.27] [2.05]
Ln(Size) 0.298*** 0.3*** 0.305*** 0.307*** 0.344*** 0.344*** 0.347***
[12.72] [13.37] [13.42] [13.47] [15.02] [14.62] [14.67]
No. of floors 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008**
[3.75] [3.81] [4.15] [4.09] [2.16] [2.15] [2.25]
Age in years −0.021*** −0.021*** −0.021*** −0.021*** −0.019*** −0.02*** −0.02***
[−9.13] [−10.00] [−9.91] [−9.86] [−8.84] [−9.16] [−9.07]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[6.94] [7.76] [7.62] [7.60] [7.06] [7.30] [7.26]
CBD (yes/no) 0.902*** 0.903*** 0.907*** 0.907*** 0.666*** 0.647*** 0.657***
[13.58] [13.81] [13.57] [13.59] [7.12] [6.73] [7.03]
Fractional stake 1.425*** 1.422*** 1.406*** 1.4 1.363*** 1.368*** 1.356***
[18.44] [19.88] [19.49] [19.41] [18.79] [18.62] [18.43]
To renovate −0.041 −0.041 −0.024 −0.022 −0.073 −0.067 −0.057
[−0.43] [−0.44] [−0.26] [−0.24] [−0.80] [−0.72] [−0.62]
Constant −7.268*** −7.573*** −7.228*** −7.67*** −8.216*** −7.853*** −8.314***
[−21.70] [−23.77] [−22.15] [−21.34] [−25.22] [−23.66] [−23.05]
Random part
Lv-3 variance 0.000 0.096
(0.000) (0.072)
Lv-2 variance 0.037 0.232*** 0.161*** 0.284*** 0.469*** 0.511***
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and newer properties all more likely to be preferred by foreign buyers, as well as
buildings in CBD locations. There is a positive relationship between fractional interests
and cross-border acquisitions. Preferences for larger assets and fractional interests are
consistent with the results of Mauck and Price (2017). It is assumed that cross-border
investors face higher information and transaction costs, so it is logical this group prefers
deals that allow them to place large amounts of capital in better known and better
monitored locations. However, a preference for fractional stakes suggests there is
interest in sharing the risks of owning newer, larger ‘trophy’ properties rather than
holding them outright.
Preferences that emerge when cross-border investors are examined in aggregate
might not hold for investors from different nations. We test for this possibility in two
ways; distinguishing buyers according to proxy measures for the cultural, economic
and institutional conditions in their home country and looking at buyers from individual
nations where sample sizes are sufficiently large. Table 4 reports results for the former
case, each panel indicating where a different set of proxy measures was used to create
the dependent variable for analysis. These models are restricted to cross-border (non-
US) buyers alone and they indicate whether particular asset attributes are more or less
associated with investors that are more distant from the US in cultural, economic or
institutional terms.
While the earlier results match our expectations, results in Table 4 are more difficult
to rationalize. A larger value for the dependent variable indicates a more ‘distant’
investor who, arguably, faces more costs and barriers and who might prefer larger or
newer assets in more central locations as a consequence. Yet the results in Table 4 show
that size is negatively related and age is positively related to ‘distance’. In contrast, the
preferences for fractional ownership and against renovation opportunities do fit the
notion of greater costs for investors from more ‘distant’ and (mostly) less developed
economies. The absence of a clear picture could reflect issues noted above in regard to
investor classification, use of proxy variables and the dominance of certain nations in
Table 3 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lv-3 RI n/a n/a Metro n/a n/a County n/a
Lv-2 RI n/a Metro Sector Metro County Sector County
Lv-2 RS n/a n/a n/a Sector n/a n/a Sector
(0.024) (0.075) (0.066) (0.080) (0.101) (0.063)
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 50,700 50,700 50,700 50,700 50,662 50,662 50,662
Wald Chi2 2276.89 2026.68 1565.97 1583.42 1662.36 1265.71 1280.05
LR test (Chi2) – 43.44 283.87 173.12 225.83 536.71 427.38
Prob > Chi2 – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Level 2 ICC – 0.01 0.07 – 0.08 0.15 –
Figures in [] denotes the z-statistic and () for standard error of random slope’s standard deviation. ***, ** and
* denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable equals 1 if the property is
bought by a cross-border investor and 0 if it is bought by a US investor. The omitted category for the metro
dummy variables is Boston and the omitted category for the sector dummy variables is apartments
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the cross-border sample. However, it might reflect variations in the scale of investors
domiciled in different nations or the influence of peer and diaspora effects that we
cannot capture in our analysis. This suggests that a closer look at samples from
individual nations is needed to build a clearer picture.
Table 5 presents the results for models that focus on investors from specific
nationalities. These models compare their purchases to those made by US investors
over the same period. Canadian investors are the subject of panel A, British investors
are examined in panel B, German investors are examined in panel C and Chinese
investors are examined in panel D. Once again, for brevity, only multilevel models that
use metro as the main level variable are reported.
The relative geographical proximity of Canadian investors, together with linguisitic
familiarity and similarity in market cultures, leads us to anticipate that they will show
less variation from domestic investors in what they purchase when compared to other
cross-border investors. Looking at panel A, it can be seen that preferences for property
types are much more muted than for cross-border investors in aggregate. There is no
marked preference for other property types at the expense of apartments as the base
type (in fact, the reverse appears to be true in model 1). This might reflect greater
familiarity among Canadian buyers with apartment investments than, say, investors
from the UK or China. Tenancy agreements and lease terms for apartment investments
are similar in Canada and the US, and institutional investors in both countries have
been active in the apartment sector for much longer than UK institutional investors, for
example.
However, Canadian investors mirrored other cross-border investors with their
relative preferences for larger, taller and newer assets, and CBD locations. A
positive link between past performance in a submarket and acquisitons is also
apparent. Greater differences were anticipated for British investors given their
reduced proximity and cultural similarity. Yet results in panel B suggest that British
buyers showed little variation from domestic investors in their property type
selections and only muted differences at best in regard to the size or height of
buildings acquired. Nonetheless, statistically significant preferences for newer
assets and CBD locations can be inferred from the results. There is no consistently
significant link to past return rates apparent for the British buyers in this sample, but
the size and sign of the coefficients is consistent with choosing types and areas with
better historical performance.
In addition to physical distance, German and Chinese investors experience greater
differences in language, institutions and market culture. We find that the sector patterns
for these investors are more distinct, indicating preferences for industrial, office and
retail assets over apartments as the base type. The intraclass correlation coefficients
show that metro and sector explain much more variation in selection decisions than in
earlier models. Yet temporal patterns captured by year fixed effects (unreported) vary
from the aggregate pattern. For example, German investors were less likely to acquire
assets during the market upswing in 2005–07, while Chinese investors were more
frequent from 2013 onwards. The trend continued through 2016, the high-water mark
for Chinese investment to the US, with the bulk of the capital originating from private
firms (see Koch-Weser and Ditz 2015). This movement of investment capital away
from China coincided with relaxations by China’s central bank on restrictions on
lending to private firms. The increased availability of debt capital led to a sharp spike
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in borrowing by private firms (see Jilani and Cheng 2018). A significant portion of
borrowed capital was used to finance purchases of US commercial real estate assets.
Results reported in panels C and D of Table 5 for other variables are more mixed,
but broadly in line with earlier insights. The coefficients suggest that German and
Chinese investors preferred larger properties and CBD locations, that Chinese
investors preferred taller buildings and avoided renovation opportunities, and that
German investors preferred newer properties. In general, the findings support the
expected outcome that larger and higher quality assets in more central areas are
preferred by cross-border investors since these can easily accommodate the desire
to invest significant capital without undue search and information costs. However,
unlike Canadian buyers and cross-border investors overall, there is no evidence that
investors from either Germany or China favoured submarkets where the past
performance had been strong.
The results so far are based on a mix of investor types that include insurance
companies, REITs, private investors and others. A potential concern is that the results
are influenced by differences in the mix of investor types between the US and foreign
groups. If a greater proportion of cross-border investors are insurance companies and
pension funds, then findings could be an artefact of institutional investor rather than
cross-border investor preferences. As a robustness check, all models were re-run on the
subset of purchases by institutional investors and public real estate companies.13
Results relating to cross-border investors in aggregate are shown in Table 6. These
results are strongly supportive of our earlier findings.14 There are no notable changes in
model performance or variance parameters versus the full sample (cf. Table 3), and the
coefficients are similarly signed and statistically significant. The main exception is with
regard to asset size where coefficients are smaller in magnitude and statistical signif-
icance is weaker. Yet preferences for newer assets and more central locations remain, as
does the greater likelihood for cross-border investors to choose market segments with
better historical return rates.
Conclusion
Rising cross-border investment in private commercial real estate markets has led to
research on the motives for investing in different nations. The motives include push
factors such as economic policies and limited opportunities in the home market, and
pull factors such as expected returns and diversification benefits from the host market.
However, risk-return benefits must be weighed against higher search, information and
transaction costs in unfamiliar markets. This applies not just to the selection of
countries in which to invest, but also to the selection of locations and assets within
target nations. Yet this issue has been largely neglected in real estate research. More-
over, cross-border investors are often treated as a single group within recent studies,
13 The RCA definition of institutions covers insurance companies, pension funds and investment management
firms, while the definition of publicly listed real estate firms covers listed Real Estate Investment Trusts and
Real Estate Operating Companies.
14 Reduced sample sizes meant that not all models for individual nationalities could be estimated reliably, but
the results for those that could be estimated were consistent with those discussed already, and can be obtained
from the authors on request.
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Table 6 Cross-border versus US buyers – institutions and publicly listed real estate firms only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lv-3 RI n/a n/a Metro n/a n/a n/a
Lv-2 RI n/a Metro Sector Metro County County
Lv-2 RS n/a n/a n/a Sector n/a Sector
Fixed part
Chicago 0.078 – – – – –
[0.58]
DC Metro −0.101 – – – – –
[−0.75]
LA Metro −0.291** – – – – –
[−2.12]
NYC Metro −0.468*** – – – – –
[−3.50]
SF Metro −0.502*** – – – – –
[−3.57]
Industrial 0.349*** 0.364*** – 0.307 0.334*** 0.433*
[3.27] [3.18] [1.14] [2.83] [1.92]
Office 0.209** 0.220** – 0.296 0.126 0.241
[2.07] [2.17] [1.13] [1.21] [1.09]
Retail 0.356*** 0.38*** – 0.543 0.342*** 0.451**
[2.92] [3.21] [2.03] [2.85] [2.02]
Prior return 4.88*** 4.584*** 4.931*** 4.777*** 4.044*** 4.541***
[4.98] [4.89] [5.06] [4.87] [4.29] [4.59]
Ln(Size) 0.058* 0.061* 0.046 0.05 0.079** 0.055
[1.74] [1.88] [1.40] [1.51] [2.41] [1.59]
No. of floors 0.009** 0.009** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.009**
[2.31] [2.34] [2.73] [2.75] [2.03] [1.98]
Age in years −0.021*** −0.022*** −0.023*** −0.023*** −0.021*** −0.024***
[−6.41] [−6.35] [−6.61] [−6.61] [−6.13] [−6.64]
Age squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
[5.27] [5.05] [5.24] [5.25] [4.95] [5.52]
CBD (yes/no) 1.027*** 1.019*** 1.018*** 1.022*** 0.67*** 0.716***
[11.42] [11.30] [10.96] [11.00] [5.28] [5.61]
Fractional stake 1.406*** 1.399*** 1.402*** 1.392*** 1.39*** 1.399***
[16.76] [17.20] [16.98] [16.84] [16.78] [16.34]
To renovate −0.083 −0.087 −0.083 −0.082 −0.103 −0.122
[−0.63] [−0.68] [−0.64] [−0.63] [−0.80] [−0.94]
Constant −3.893*** −4.108*** −3.82*** −4.142*** −4.288*** −4.234***
[−8.40] [−9.22] [−8.34] [−8.51] [−9.48] [−8.54]
Random part
Lv-3 variance 0.000
(0.000)
Lv-2 variance 0.040 0.192*** 0.396*** 0.203*** 0.641***
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whereas there is considerable diversity in preferences between groups and this is
affected by the perspectives and constraints guiding investors based in different nations.
We used an extensive dataset of US commercial real estate transactions to identify
the factors that most affected the probability of sale to a non-US investor over 2003–16,
a period that includes a major market cycle. Six major ‘gateway’ markets for cross-
border investment were identified in which there was sufficient scale and depth of
foreign investment activity to identify and separate out cross-border investors both in
aggregate and from specific nations. Canada, the UK, Germany and China/Hong Kong
were identified as the main source nations for inbound commercial real estate invest-
ment in this sample, countries that vary in their geographical proximity, culture and
domestic investment opportunities. We find that cross-border investors in general focus
on larger assets, newer assets and CBD locations, consistent with maximizing efficien-
cy of investment within the most transparent and best researched submarkets, but
preferences for specific metros and property types varied across the different national
groups studied.
This work is among only a small collection of studies to consider foreign investment
issues with asset level data. It applies multilevel logit techniques in recognition of the
decision making stages and area-related attributes likely to influence the selection of
individual assets. The use of metros as a key variable in this framework reflects how
investors target particular metros and MSAs in their search for investment product.
Studying investors from the top four source nations for cross-border investment
individually allowed us to examine whether different groups of foreign investors
exhibited different preferences relative to their US counterparts. This is an important
component of this study as the preferences of different cross-border investor groups are
lost when they are aggregated together.
Among other important findings is the apparent propensity of cross-border investors
to follow past performance more than domestic investors when selecting areas and
Table 6 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lv-3 RI n/a n/a Metro n/a n/a n/a
Lv-2 RI n/a Metro Sector Metro County County
Lv-2 RS n/a n/a n/a Sector n/a Sector
(0.028) (0.068) (0.073) (0.071) (0.071)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Obs. 11,054 11,054 11,054 11,054 11,043 11,043
Wald Chi2 882.39 801.51 723.40 727.85 619.05 561.83
LR test (Chi squared) – 20.01 97.19 78.64 64.69 157.50
Prob > Chi-squared – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Level 2 ICC – 0.01 0.06 – 0.06 –
Figures in [] denotes the z-statistic and () for standard error of random slope’s standard deviation. Dependent
variable equals 1 if the property is bought by a cross-border investor and 0 if it is bought by a US investor. The
omitted category for the metro dummy variables is Boston and the omitted category for the sector dummy
variables is apartments. Three level random intercept model does not fit in the instance when counties are used
and the sample has been restricted
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property types. This raises questions as to whether cross-border investors exhibit return
chasing behavior or simply require greater evidence of a track record in a submarket
before investing, the result of greater information and transaction costs versus domestic
buyers. We found that trend chasing was not common for all cross-border investors; it
was most marked in the case of Canadian investors in US real estate. This and other
findings raise an important methodological implication for future research. While it is
common to study cross-border real estate investors in aggregate (possibly because of
the data available), we believe that more research is needed on the investment decisions
and motivations of different investor groups in globalized commercial real estate
investment markets.
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